Tuesday, March 30, 2010

Confirmatory power of the pandeistic model

There is great misunderstanding about what exactly the pandeistic model is, or why it offers so great a confirmatory power. Simply put, the pandeistic model determines which explanations can possibly account for observed physical and metaphysical phenomena, and then boils them down to the one explanation that requires the fewest assumptions in fulfilling this explanatory need. If a religion were to confirmably present an observation that could not be accounted for by the pandeistic model, but instead required adoption of an additional assumption, logic would indeed demand that this assumption be adopted; but every single observation must be weighed to determine whether it demands the adoption of additional assumptions, and every assumption must be weighed for determination of whether any simpler model accounts for the things it would assume....

Atheists label pandeism as theism, and theists label it as atheism; and yet, pandeism fully accounts for the things atheists believe as well; indeed, it would be folly to exclude atheism from the pandeistic model of examination, for atheism does not actually explain anything so much as assert that the explanation, though unknown, is not or can not be theological -- this is what divides the starkness of atheism from the explanatory power of the pandeistic model.

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